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Writing that reveals a high type of discovery is literature. 
—William Carlos Williams and Robert McAlmon, editorial note, Contact, 19211
Contact 
It’s the secret 
It’s the moment 
When everything happens 
—Introductory sequence, 3–2–1 Contact, 1983–862
In 1989, four poets of the variety that came to be called “Language” traveled to Leningrad 
for an international conference on culture and poetics, bringing these writers—so influ-
enced by the Russian avant-garde of an earlier moment—into direct personal contact 
with the Russian avant-garde’s Cold War–era successors. In Leningrad, the book that 
they wrote collaboratively about the experience, Ron Silliman explicitly frames the con-
ference in world-historical and, specifically, Cold War terms: it occurs “during that brief 
window in world history between the Tiananmen Square massacre in Beijing and the 
fall of the Berlin Wall and the Eastern bloc,” and although the conference is conceived 
as “international,” Lyn Hejinian observes that “the French were right in saying that the 
conference was more a dialogue between Russians and Americans.”3 Ever aware of their 
own situatedness in history, the Language writers sought to effect a cultural encounter 
outside the terms of a state ideology that they saw as fully complicit with mass atrocity, 
most notably in Vietnam.4 As Hejinian would later put it in “Barbarism,” her unfaithful 
reflection on Theodor Adorno’s most infamous comment, “the word ‘barbarism,’ as it 
comes to us from the Greek barbaros, means ‘foreign’—that is, ‘not speaking the same 
language’ . . .—and such is precisely the task of poetry: not to speak the same language 
as Auschwitz. Poetry after Auschwitz must indeed be barbarian; it must be foreign to 
the cultures that produce atrocities.”5 In this rewriting of Russian formalist ostranenie, 
Hejinian stakes out an ethics and politics of language with explicit geopolitical reso-
nances in a historical present of which she is keenly aware.
 My inquiry here has to do with US “experimental writing”—not every text that has 
ever been called experimental, nor every text that is indebted to scientific thinking (a 
notion that, as I will discuss below, is very fraught), but rather, the tessitura or general 
center of what contemporary writers and critics usually mean by the term—for instance, 
when Charles Altieri writes about “poets trained in the experimental or ‘innovative’ tra-
dition,” or when Laura Hinton and Cynthia Hogue use the word in the subtitle of their 
essay collection We Who Love to Be Astonished.6 It is a term that perhaps lacks a meaning, 
but has very definite uses all the same.7 What makes it “American,” despite clear debts to 
Russian, and other, literary history? Why did it emerge as a descriptive term, as Paul Ste-
phens has argued, not in the period with which it is most associated—the early twentieth 
century—but rather the 1980s?8 How can we account for its simultaneous durability, in 
aggregating a fairly well-established set of critical expectations, and its tendency to dis-
solve, give way, or expand infinitely upon scrutiny? The aims of this essay are trifold. 
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First, I wish to show how Language writing in the 1980s, and indeed a broader criti-
cal practice of self-rehistoricization in that moment, helped to discover-invent the early 
twentieth century as the canonical scene of literary experimentalism. Second, I wish to 
offer, through what Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison have called “epistemic virtues,” 
a rubric for understanding experimentalism that can capture its potentialities without 
altogether falling for its rhetorics.9 And finally, I wish to illustrate how epistemic virtues 
operate in literary experimentalism through an example, that of William Carlos Williams 
and what he persisted in calling “contact.” In this, I will be crucially concerned with ques-
tions of time: historicization, periodization, recovery, temporal folding, and primitivism; 
for in re-narrating a “usable past” of (primarily US) literary experimentalism, the Lan-
guage writers sought to puncture the time of liberal empire, setting up relays of historical 
resonance whose echoes now emerge as a periodization problem for experimentalism. 
>> Barbarism
As Silliman’s self-historicization—placing the Leningrad conference between the events 
at Tiananmen Square and the Berlin Wall—attests, Language writing’s sense of its own 
historicity is explicitly a sense of what Benedict Anderson identified as the simultaneity 
of homogeneous, empty time—the time of nation and the time of empire.10 Things are 
happening “at the same time,” so that Language’s sense of the simultaneity of homoge-
neous, empty time emerges in what Sianne Ngai has intriguingly called its “paranoid” 
sensitivity to “bad timing”: “why is it that at the same time . . . ?”11 Thus, for instance, 
Tom Mandel observes of the programmer Bob Frankston that “while we were creating 
‘Language poetry’ he was writing Visicalc,” the popular spreadsheet software released 
in 1983.12 This sense of simultaneity, that while this happens, that happens too, and that 
these events may be causally connected but they also may not, pervades Language writ-
ing.13 Ted Pearson would retrospectively note that 
the period in question [the early days of Language poetry] began at the end of the postwar 
“economic miracle” and at the onset of a long and devastating recession, deepened by the 
astronomic debt and social misery that resulted from the pursuit of imperial ambition, if not 
yet, as is now clear, overtly global hegemony—a pursuit that barely paused to reload when 
Saigon “fell.”. . . 
Not coincidentally, it was also the moment when the nation’s “unlimited drift/to the right” 
emerged from conservative think tanks and fundamentalist pulpits.14 
Not coincidentally, but not altogether causally either. Thus Language’s self-historiciza-
tion projects a deep formal inhabitation of the structures of empire’s time, and a regret-
ful awareness that “bad timing” is, so to speak, the way time works now.15 Language writ-
ers understood themselves to be in and of US empire even as they opposed it.
 Structurally as well as thematically, then, Language writers repeatedly turned their 
attention to the relationship between language and US imperialism. Mediating that rela-
tionship was a key third term, knowledge: “Does poetry have any knowledge, and if so, 
Experimentalism by Contact >> Natalia Cecire 9
what?” Barrett Watten asks in Leningrad.16 For these writers, knowledge and its verifi-
ability were deeply at issue in any question of language’s right relation to the world, in 
ways that were profoundly politically consequential. Elsewhere in Leningrad, Watten 
positions Language writing against state propaganda, understood as embodying a false 
relation between language and world and, thus, an epistemological travesty. “While the 
[American] liberal press has been cranking out one or another of [two official] versions 
of the Soviet state for the last forty years,” he writes, “poets and other artists have qui-
etly been investigating, by means of identification with the modern art and literature 
of the Soviet 1920s, ways to avoid either of these (by necessity incomplete) totaliza-
tions.”17 Such “investigating” on the writers’ part attacked the massive state knowledge-
production infrastructures that inaugurated the age of big science, as well as defense 
strategy, CIA-funded American and area studies, and the Study of Culture at a Distance 
project, led by Margaret Mead and conducted at Columbia University in the 1950s—the 
knowledge-producing order that Paul Erickson, Judy L. Klein, Lorraine Daston, Rebecca 
Lemov, Thomas Sturm, and Michael D. Gordin have recently termed “Cold War rational-
ity.”18 Tellingly, in Watten’s account, such resistance was not only a matter of knowledge, 
but one that looked to epistemological models from the 1920s as resources. This would 
become a recurring move in Language’s poetic and critical practice.
  A brief consideration of the cybernetic moment of Cold War rationality reveals why 
resistance to state imperialism through language, and specifically poetry, seemed par-
ticularly apt. Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer (also writing in the 1980s) influentially 
described experimental science as a “language-game” and a “form of life,” borrow-
ing Ludwig Wittgenstein’s terms to illustrate the continuities between discursive and 
empirical “moves” in the work of the seventeenth-century natural philosopher Robert 
Boyle.19 The “language-game” is a particularly congenial frame for understanding Cold 
War rationality, and indeed, Wittgenstein is a philosophical tributary to that current 
of midcentury thought.20 In her 1987 essay “Sex and Death in the Rational World of 
Defense Intellectuals,” Carol Cohn describes her experience of a year’s immersion in a 
nuclear strategy center run by “defense intellectuals,” “civilians who move in and out of 
government, working sometimes as administrative officials or consultants, sometimes at 
universities and think tanks,” and who “create the theory that informs and legitimates 
American nuclear strategic practice.”21 Though she never specifically uses the Wittgen-
steinian term, Cohn argues that the world of Cold War nuclear strategy is very much a 
language-game, in the sense that Wittgenstein proposes: the sum of its potential legible 
moves, which might include not only utterances but also gestures, calculations, and dev-
astating mass destruction, constitutes a “form of life.” Cohn documents how the language 
of expertise among defense intellectuals constitutes a closed ecosystem of intelligibility, 
one that centralizes weapons. “In technostrategic discourse,” Cohn writes, “the refer-
ence point is not white men, it is not human beings at all; it is the weapons themselves.” 
This means that “it is not only impossible to talk about humans in this language, it also 
becomes in some sense illegitimate to ask the paradigm to reflect human concerns.”22 As 
Erickson et al. argue, 
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What was distinctive about Cold War rationality was the expansion of the domain of ratio-
nality at the expense of that of reason, asserting its claims in the loftiest realms of political 
decision making and scientific method—and sometimes not only in competition with but in 
downright opposition to reason, reasonableness, and common sense.23 
Cohn’s analysis suggests that if language is not exactly the problem—for, in fact, she will 
explicitly argue that language per se is not the issue—then it is at least symptomatic of a 
problem.24 “Learning to speak the language,” she writes, “reveals something about how 
thinking can become more abstract, more focused on parts disembedded from their con-
text, more attentive to the survival of weapons than the survival of human beings.”25 
 Picking up again Ngai’s observation that Language’s temporality of simultaneity has 
a “paranoid” valence, the language-oriented nature of resistance becomes clearer. After 
all, as Timothy Melley has argued, Cold War paranoia centers not on sinister agents but 
on paths of communication; knowledge itself emerges as essentially linguistic and, often, 
hermetically formalist.26 Hejinian extends this line of thinking in “Barbarism,” aiming 
through language to reintroduce contact with the outside world—empiricism—to Cold 
War rationality. “The emphasis on language in our writing,” Hejinian writes, “can be 
explained by our sense of urgency of the need to address and, if possible, to redress social 
fraud,” since, as she adds, “fraud produces 
atrocity.”27 This imperative in Language 
writing is well documented, as is the fact 
that it arises from the writers’ sense of a 
tight coupling between linguistic fraud 
and state-sanctioned atrocity, as outlined 
by theorists like Adorno and Benjamin. 
“The pervasive hypocrisy of the 1950s and 
1960s was operating in several strategic 
forms,” Hejinian specifies: “as outright lies 
(e.g., ‘Everybody is happy in Alabama’), as 
deceptive metaphors (as in that depicting 
Vietnam as an upended domino liable to 
fall to Communism . . .), and, finally, in the 
more subtle form of a complete failure to 
examine political language and indeed any 
language at all, thus establishing the pre-
tense that language is ‘natural.’ ”28 All of these “strategic forms” are linguistic. But Hejin-
ian’s choice of words—“strategic forms”—points toward the Cold War context in which 
this language is embedded, for strategic forms are the substance not only of the language 
that conduces to atrocity but also the language-game of Cold War rationality.
 This, I would argue, is one reason that Language writing so heavily preoccupied 
itself with knowledge and knowledge-production in its dual poetic and critical proj-
ects. It sought to produce an “experimental” writing that was genuinely productive of 
Language writing preoccupied itself with 
knowledge and knowledge-production in its 
dual poetic and critical projects. It sought 
to produce an “experimental” writing that 
was genuinely productive of knowledge, yet 
“alien” to the state-sanctioned, knowledge-
producing language, and language-game, 
of defense strategy.
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knowledge, yet “alien” to the state-sanctioned, knowledge-producing language, and 
language-game, of defense strategy. A primarily American trajectory of experimental 
writing was canonized and popularized within the historical context of a late Cold War 
and post-Vietnam attempt to develop a poetics whose epistemological strength could 
meaningfully counter the epistemological dominance of state rationality in its various 
institutional manifestations. Thus, for example, a group of Language writers argued in 
1988 that “beginning with Stein and Zukofsky, and significantly reinforced by the exam-
ples of the abstract poems of Frank O’Hara and John Ashbery and the aleatorical texts 
of Jackson MacLow [sic] in the fifties, there has been a continuity of experimental work 
that foregrounds its status as written language.”29 Similarly, in “Barbarism,” Hejinian 
identifies an “experimental tradition in American poetry, with sources in Pound’s imag-
ism and Stein’s realism” characterized by “an impassioned regard for and address to the 
world” and an “aesthetic discovery [that] is congruent with social discovery.”30 The use 
of “experimental” to indicate something like its current usage was not an invention of 
the 1980s, of course, with casual instances appearing across the 1930s and '40s. James 
Laughlin, the publisher of New Directions, for example, introduced Spearhead: 10 Years’ 
Experimental Writing in America (1947), with a familiar account of the term “experimen-
tal” as defined in the negative, against those who are “content to work within the techni-
cal limits current as conventional tradition.”31 And as Eva Díaz has recently explained, 
“experimental” was also a powerful (if often incoherent) transdisciplinary trope at Black 
Mountain College.32 Yet the concept blooms and takes on new and more specific conno-
tations in Language writing from the 1970s, which in turn, as Andrew Epstein has out-
lined, powerfully shaped academic discourses from the early 1980s on.33 The production 
of this “continuity” in the extensive critical writings of the period helped to consolidate a 
provisional canon of American experimentalism whose center of gravity lay in the early 
twentieth century.34 
 A powerful source of current conventions around US experimentalism can thus be 
located in Language’s self-conscious engagement with knowledge-production as a mode 
of intervening in liberal empire. I offer this double periodization as an alternative to 
the strategies advanced by many others attempting to grasp the period quandaries of 
the experimental.35 The experimental as a literary-historical category often seems to 
demand a Whig history, somewhat on the model of the history of poetic inventions about 
which Ezra Pound once fantasized, and which Pound explicitly warrants by analogy 
with the sciences: a linear progression of “innovations” beginning with Francis Bacon 
(as Matias Viegener suggests) or, alternatively, with the word “experiment” in William 
Wordsworth’s 1801 preface to Lyrical Ballads, or with Émile Zola’s use of the term in 
the 1880s.36 The desirability of such accounts (and the seeming imperative to generate 
them) is already prompted by experimentalism’s associations with the sciences, and the 
continued prevalence of just such linear accounts of scientific knowledge. As Ken Alder 
has recently put it, “science, in the prevailing view, still designates that form of natural 
knowledge that winnows truth from error to produce a state-of-the-art summation of 
all and only those prior discoveries that possess current value,” and, “in this sense . . . 
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swallows its own past.”37 But this model of the sciences itself belongs to specific histori-
cal discourses, as I will discuss below; moreover, it does a bad job of accounting for the 
work that the experimental generally does in contemporary criticism.
 That experimentalism’s parameters have in many ways been set in response to an epis-
temological struggle fairly specific to the post-Vietnam, late Cold War moment does not 
render it a nonsense category; I wish to emphasize that in addition to having an agenda 
specific to their moment, the Language writers are also very good critics. As a term, 
“experimental” does meaningful critical work in aggregating a generalized set of formal 
and historical expectations. Through the critical work of creative writers in the later 
twentieth century these expectations have come to be anchored in an early twentieth-
century canon affiliated with, but neither identical with nor limited to, high modernism.38 
This is a provisional and unstable canon, but certain authors appear in it repeatedly, espe-
cially Gertrude Stein, Ezra Pound, William Carlos Williams, and Louis Zukofsky. 
 To put it another way, “experimental writing,” as a critical category, is a white recov-
ery project. With this framing, I wish to deliberately set up a parallel and contrast with 
contemporaneous recovery projects of the late Cold War, especially among black, Chi-
cano, and feminist writers and scholars. In recanonizing an “oppositional” version of a 
(tacitly but universally white) modernism that they, with reason, believed to have been 
suppressed by dominant Cold War discourses, Language writers also allowed what they 
saw as experimentalism’s more fundamen-
tal purchase on the political to take prece-
dence over the specific politics of embod-
ied, and especially racial, categories.39 As 
Dorothy Wang has argued, experimental 
and racialized poetics are often treated as 
mutually exclusive propositions, on the 
assumption that the former must reject 
“identity” while the other must embrace 
it, resulting in what Harryette Mullen 
has termed an “aesthetic apartheid.”40 A 
closer examination of experimentalism’s 
stakes reveals that this is not simply a 
matter of “excluding” writers of color—as 
Wang, Mullen, and others observe, espe-
cially since the 1990s, Language and post-
Language writers have made an effort 
to “include” some writers of color, albeit 
often on the unspoken condition that their 
racialization be effaced.41 Rather, as Anthony Reed has pointed out, the logic of inclu-
sion simply “made room for female and nonwhite writers without questioning why non-
white, nonmale writers had not been more involved in the first place.”42 Doubling back 
on the century to produce an all white experimental “usable past,” Language writers 
In recanonizing an “oppositional” version of 
a (tacitly but universally white) modernism 
that they, with reason, believed to have 
been suppressed by dominant Cold War 
discourses, Language writers also allowed 
what they saw as experimentalism’s more 
fundamental purchase on the political to 
take precedence over the specific politics of 
embodied, and especially racial, categories.
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laid claim to an epistemological purchase on the real to rival that of the military-indus-
trial complex’s Big Science. In doing so, they invested hope in a range of epistemological 
orders that had historically tended to understand people of color primarily as objects 
of study, rather than as (in Bob Perelman’s words) the “engaged, oppositional intellec-
tual” who needed recovering.43 This helps to explain why, as Stefania Heim has observed 
in a recent Boston Review roundtable co-edited with Wang, despite “Mullen’s decades-
old description” of the problem—not to mention a substantial and growing scholarship 
on contemporary writing by people of color—experimentalism’s default to whiteness 
remains painfully live.44 Far from naturalizing a trajectory of white “scientific” experi-
mentalism, I wish to reveal how it came to be produced, often through the valorization 
of scientific ideals that are deeply ethically compromised, especially on racial grounds. 
In other words, the production of an “experimental” canon with significant resonances 
in the sciences is frequently implicitly racist, not least because the sciences that serve as 
touchstones are historically implicitly racist. Especially insofar as literary experimen-
talism, through its conceptualization as knowledge-production, is often explicitly posi-
tioned as a source of ethical and political virtue, I wish to place pressure on the history 
of those virtues, to honor their stakes and intentions while disclosing their limitations.
 “Experimental,” when applied to US writing, means many things, but tends to aggre-
gate a relatively (but only relatively!) stable set of critical expectations, including formal 
disjuncture, a sense of political or ethical commitment, and an association, but not strict 
identification, with the experimental sciences.45 Some of the expectations around exper-
imentalism embody tensions if not outright contradictions, which it is part of my task 
to attempt to explain. For example, experimentalism has a very vexed relationship to 
historicization: it is repeatedly associated with the early twentieth-century, and is often 
used interchangeably with “avant-garde,” but “experimental” is also the word to which 
we turn when we want to avoid confining ourselves to the early twentieth century. In 
part, this registers the way that “experimental” sometimes operates as an honorific: to 
say that a work, of whatever period, is not experimental can easily be construed as an 
insult.46 Likewise, while experimentalism is often thought to reside in form, there is no 
particular set of forms that can guarantee that a work will be received as experimental, 
which registers the necessity of an account of experimentalism that can accommodate 
enormous formal diversity. To explain these expectations further, I wish to turn to the 
aforementioned historical center of gravity, the early twentieth century, to examine what 
it meant to be experimental.
>> Experimentalism
At the turn of the twentieth century, written engagement with problems of knowledge 
and scientific knowledge took place in dialogue with the proliferation, consolidation, 
and institutionalization of new scientific domains, and with the reconfigurations of 
“method” that they both required and propagated.47 A new popular understanding of the 
nature of science—as an animating force abstractable from its articulation in particular 
14 DIACRITICS >> 2015 >> 43.1
acts or social settings—underwrote a conviction that all domains of experience could 
be improved by a renewed commitment to knowledge, and that “scientific” methods—
whatever that meant—were the best way to enact that commitment. 
 Broad public assent to the abstraction of scientific method was a historical phenom-
enon that made it possible to construe new specific acts and discourses as experimen-
tal. Some of these practices, like psychology, would maintain an association with the 
experimental over the decades, while others, like Montessori education, would not. In 
none of the new domains of the late nineteenth century’s science boom was a single, 
standard “method” applied; rather, the abstraction of method—sometimes a radical 
abstraction to an experimental “spirit” or “sentiment”—opened experimentalism up to 
multifarious instantiation. 
 Though the notion of an abstractable method has (much-claimed) roots in Francis 
Bacon’s Novum Organum, it became popular in the great age of popular science, the 
nineteenth century.48 Aggressive efforts to promote and popularize science in the nine-
teenth century relied significantly on a rhetoric of “method.” As Richard Yeo, writing of 
British popularizers such as John Herschel, William Whewell, and the British Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Science, has observed, “the distinction between the content 
and method of science has been a significant element in the cultural legitimation of the 
scientific enterprise.”49 The centrality of method as a defining feature of scientificity, and 
of experimentalism in particular, is a historical and quite intentional phenomenon. “At 
various levels of debate,” Yeo continues, 
scientific method was represented as accessible, single, and transferable. These three charac-
terizations respectively claimed that the method of science could be understood and prac-
tised by a large number of people; that there was a single method common to all branches of 
science; and that this method could be extrapolated from natural science to other subjects.50
As John Rudolph has documented, such popularization efforts met with exceptional 
success in the United States, where the teaching of scientific experiment came to be 
seen as a pedagogical necessity.51 As high school enrollments soared, the burdensome 
teaching of specific techniques gave way to what the Italian educator Maria Montessori, 
proposing her “experimental pedagogy,” called a “scientific spirit” residing in the “mind 
and heart.” Thus the entomologist Stephen Alfred Forbes argued in 1904 that “scientific 
method” was “not the mere use of tools of any sort, however complicated and valuable; 
not the manipulation of apparatus, or any form of mechanical operation on anything,” 
but rather a “mental method, and the study of this method is a study of the action of the 
scientific mind while engaged in the pursuit of scientific truth.”52 This popular under-
standing of “the scientific method” came to be codified in and widely propagated by the 
philosopher and educator John Dewey’s description of a five-step scientific reasoning 
process in his 1910 textbook for teachers, How We Think.53 
 The abstraction of method rendered science’s terrain—whatever “science” was—
infinite, in principle. Thus in his widely read 1892 treatise The Grammar of Science, the 
influential statistician and eugenicist Karl Pearson asserted that “the field of science is 
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unlimited; its material is endless, every group of natural phenomena, every phase of 
social life, every stage of past or present development is material for science.”54 More-
over, “every phase,” for Pearson, included aesthetic domains: aesthetic experience rested 
upon epistemological satisfaction:
Does not the beauty of the artist’s work lie for us in the accuracy with which his symbols 
resume innumerable facts of our past emotional experience? . . . If this account of the aes-
thetic judgment be at all a true one, the reader will have remarked how exactly parallel it is to 
the scientific judgment.55 
Pearson argued, in other words, for an aesthetics of knowledge: knowledge was aestheti-
cally satisfying, and aesthetic satisfaction depended on a work’s reliability as knowledge.
 In the context of these rhetorics, experimental writing gained an air of desirability 
and, indeed, inevitability. For this is the rhetorical tack that Zola took in his polemical 
1889 essay “The Experimental Novel.”56 Borrowing from an 1865 work by the physiolo-
gist Claude Bernard—somewhat beyond Bernard’s own expectations or intentions—Zola 
represented the advent of an experimental literature as the natural extension of a pro-
gression that was already happening in the sciences, beginning with the canonically 
experimental sciences (the physical sciences) and extending thereafter to the sciences of 
life (such as Bernard’s experimental medicine), the new social sciences, and finally—tri-
umphantly—the experimental novel.57 “From that point, we move into the domain that, 
until now, belonged to philosophy and literature; it will be the sciences’ decisive con-
quest of the hypotheses of the philosophers and writers,” Zola wrote. “We have experi-
mental chemistry and physics; we will have [Bernard’s] experimental physiology; still 
further on, we will have the experimental novel.”58
 The new yet uncertain reach of scientific authority made experimentalism a status 
to which any knowledge-producing enterprise might aspire. Yet for precisely that rea-
son, existing scientific practices were challenged to accommodate new and recalcitrant 
objects of study, and it was far from clear what an experimental medicine—much less 
an experimental novel—might look like in the decades when both came to seem pro-
foundly desirable. These conditions pose a challenge to the expectation that what is 
experimental about experimental writing will be locatable at science’s most canonical 
sites: the well-established, the clearly (rather than marginally) experimental, the physi-
cal, the professional, the masculine, the safely non-pseudo.59 On the contrary, what was 
generative for experimentalism seems to have been epistemological volatility, the need 
or desire for meaningful verification precisely where it was rendered inherently prob-
lematic by recalcitrant objects (such as “culture”) and historically pre- or unprofessional 
knowing subjects (such as women, servants, the “public,” people of color, amateurs, and, 
of course, poets).60
 This is, I would suggest, the historical substrate of the many attempts to link experi-
mental writing to experimental science—not a set of acts or methods, in the end, but a set 
of values. This has two important consequences. First, experimental writing’s ambivalent 
tether to the early twentieth century can be explained by the fact that the early twentieth 
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century is the historical period in which scientific knowledge most fully begins to assert 
itself as independent of historical period. Second, the early twentieth-century abstrac-
tion of method means that we should not seek experimentalism in “experiments” per 
se, but rather in the attachments and epistemological orientations that animate method, 
and the practices in which they are borne out, in what Lorraine Daston and Peter Gali-
son have called “epistemic virtues.”61 For Daston and Galison, epistemic virtues capture 
the double epistemological-ethical function of scientific desiderata, most notably objec-
tivity, in their 2007 book of the same name, but, as I explore elsewhere, others as well: 
flash, precision, and contact. Epistemic virtues are animating principles that serve to 
guarantee the validity of knowledge-production, and, in that role, have both epistemo-
logical and ethical valences. Thus, as Daston and Galison write, “Epistemic virtues are 
virtues properly so-called: they are norms that are internalized and enforced by appeal 
to ethical values, as well as to pragmatic efficacy in securing knowledge.”62 Vigilance in 
a scientist, for example, means not missing anything (an epistemological good); it also 
means a certain kind of intellectual and bodily discipline in the scientist herself: the abil-
ity to stay awake, pay attention, notice details (an ethical good, in the Foucauldian sense 
of ethos). A clear articulation of contemporary experimental investment in epistemic 
virtues is Joan Retallack’s notion of the “poethical wager,” which explicitly names “the 
sciences” as a model for ethical poetic “swerves.”63 But Hejinian’s notion of a poetics 
against “fraud” equally, if less overtly, collapses ethical and epistemological registers.64 
The centrality of epistemic virtues in the history of experimental writing helps to explain 
the ethical virtue so often attributed to experimental writing in the last few decades.65 
Importantly, those ethics are often assumed to align with other, socially generated ethi-
cal codes, but often do not, as we will see with Williams.
  As Daston and Galison point out, epistemic virtues need not be consistent with one 
another; indeed, in many cases they compete. For example, “objectivity” and “contact” 
operate in ways that are nearly at odds: objectivity attempts, as much as possible, to 
maintain a distinction between knowledge 
“itself” and the person who engages in 
knowledge-production, whereas contact 
cultivates knowledge by proximity, immer-
sion, and participation. Yet both seek to 
guarantee knowledge. The potential for 
significant conflict between epistemic vir-
tues reflects the tension between diverse 
knowledge-making practices and the con-
solidation of a unified notion of science. 
Single epistemic virtues (say, objectivity) 
can animate diverse methods; thus, for instance, prioritizing a spiritual disposition over 
specific methods allowed Montessori to assert the specificity of “the intimate relation-
ship between the observer and the individual to be observed [i.e., between the teacher 
and the student]; a relationship which does not exist between the student of zoology or 
The expectation that virtues in general will 
be mutually compatible means that 
different epistemic virtues are often treated 
as being in agreement (these practices are 
all “scientific”) even when they are not.
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botany and that form of nature which he studies.”66 Epistemic virtues make it possible 
to understand diverse practices, including literary practices, as scientific. Moreover, the 
expectation that virtues in general will be mutually compatible means that different 
epistemic virtues are often treated as being in agreement (these practices are all “scien-
tific”) even when they are not. Such elisions, already presupposed by constructing a uni-
fied science, allow us to understand writers as epistemologically and stylistically distinct 
as Pound and Stein as similarly exemplarily “experimental,” and thus help to explain the 
wide diversity of literary forms that can be understood as experimental.67 Scientific and 
literary practices in the early twentieth century realized epistemic virtues in different 
ways, seeking not so much to perform experiments as to establish provisional yet robust 
modes of verification in places where they were by definition hard to come by.
>> Contact and First Contact
For the remainder of this essay, I wish to briefly examine one particular epistemic virtue, 
contact, as it appears in both Boasian anthropology and in the writing of William Carlos 
Williams. In 1921, W. C. Blum, writing in The Dial, ribbed Williams about “this modest 
quality of realness” about his poetry, “which he attributes to ‘contact’ with the good Jer-
sey dirt.”68 The Dial could joke about this because Williams was famously obsessed with 
the idea of “contact” as a principle of the local, in an instance of what Michael North, 
borrowing a line from Marianne Moore, has called “plain American.”69 In the inaugural 
issue of his journal Contact, which he launched with Robert McAlmon in 1920, for in-
stance, Williams called for an insistence on “the essential contact between words and the 
locality that breeds them, in this case America.”70 
 Around the same time, anthropology, the scientific study of culture, instituted field-
work as its most cherished professional norm. Though there are many candidates for 
the “first” academic fieldworker—and the development of professional norms around 
fieldwork was gradual—the historian of anthropology George Stocking suggests that 
“the emergent ‘moment’ of the archetypal fieldworker is the decade or so following 
World War I.”71 Fieldwork was experimental without doing experiments, and contact 
made this possible. “Those who went out from the university into the field in the 1920s,” 
Stocking argues, 
were confident that they were doing ethnography in a different, more efficient, more reliable, 
more “scientific” way than the travellers, missionaries, and government officials whom they 
were pushing to the margins of the discipline. Expressed in the metaphor of the ethnographic 
field as a “laboratory,” in which a distinctive method was employed to test previously assumed 
comparative (or merely culturally traditional) generalizations about human behavior, this 
disciplinary self-image was projected with considerable success outward to the surrounding 
social sciences, and even beyond to the general intellectual and literate public.72
The metaphor of the laboratory produced contact with a locality as an epistemologi-
cal guarantee: to know a culture was to go there. Ever since James Clifford opened The 
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Predicament of Culture with a reading of “To Elsie,” it has been almost a cliché to read 
Williams through anthropology, but unlike Clifford, I am not interested in reading Wil-
liams as a kind of fieldworker.73 Rather, I am interested in the way that contact operates 
as an epistemic virtue across ethnographic and poetic practices. For what at first seems 
like a principle of pure simplicity, a dyadic relation of proximity between language and 
land, is soon revealed as highly temporally layered.
 Contact emerged in Williams’s writings as a guarantor of knowledge within a poetics 
whose modernity was explicitly bound up in knowledge-production: “at the beginning of 
a movement,” he wrote in The Embodiment of Knowledge, “when a new form is set, the 
chief poems are created. It is not novelty, though of necessity the great must [be] the new, 
it is the increase of knowledge that is the deciding point.”74 The language of beginnings, 
here, is as important as the language of knowledge-production: I wish to suggest that 
contact operates as a principle of discov-
ery, in its multiple valences as knowledge-
production, as first contact (as in the “dis-
covery” of the Americas), and as an origin 
story for a “plain American” literary form 
that favors metonymy (a relation, again, of 
contact) over metaphor. Although it was 
sometimes expressed as a relation of pure 
simplicity, contact continually reenacts 
scenes of “discovery” that embody tem-
poral and spatial tension. Contact is both 
perpetually new and a way of accessing a 
distant past; it is both “local” and defined 
by travel to a distant location. Thus Wil-
liams’s In the American Grain (1925) stages 
and restages the “discovery” of America, beginning with the earliest Viking settlements 
and moving through Columbus, Cortés, Ponce de León, de Soto, and so on, stretching into 
the mid-nineteenth century and producing a long and palimpsestic sequence of scenes of 
contact. Even American slavery is perversely staged as an episode of arrival and discov-
ery: “these were just men of a certain mettle who came to America in ships, like the rest.”75 
 As Mary Louise Pratt has pointed out, ethnographic fieldwork in the early twenti-
eth century conventionally defined itself against the “unscientific” contact of explor-
ers, travel writers, and missionaries. At the same time, however, the narration of ethno-
graphic contact has often recapitulated the literary tropes of narratives of first contact; 
thus, Pratt notes, Raymond Firth’s We, the Tikopia (1936) closely echoes what she calls 
“the classic Polynesian arrival scene . . . commonplace in the literature of the South Sea 
explorations of Cook, Bougainville and others in the 1760s and '70s.”76 As Pratt continues,
Firth reproduces in a remarkably straightforward way a utopian scene of first contact that 
acquired mythic status in the eighteenth century, and continues with us today in the popular 
Although it was sometimes expressed 
as a relation of pure simplicity, contact 
continually reenacts scenes of “discovery” 
that embody temporal and spatial tension. 
Contact is both perpetually new and a way 
of accessing a distant past; it is both “local” 
and defined by travel to a distant location.
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mythology of the South Sea paradise. . . . Far from being taken for a suspicious alien, the Euro-
pean visitor is welcomed as a messiah by a trusting populace ready to do his or her bidding.77
For Pratt, the persistence of literary tropes of first contact in classic ethnographies is 
a sign of the unscientific subjectivity that the professional fieldworker must live with 
(as part of the participant-observer method) but suppress in the writing of the mono-
graph.78 The legacies of colonialism, exoticist travel writing, and proselytization are to 
be disavowed, yet insofar as those legacies are disavowed, the fieldworker is constrained 
to represent ethnographic contact as first contact—first, in that preceding episodes of 
contact do not “count.” Pratt’s account helps to illuminate the dimension of constraint 
or disavowal in ethnographic contact of the 1920s and '30s. Breaking with a prescientific 
legacy, professional fieldwork was forced to “make it new”—that is, make contact anew, 
make ethnographic contact into first contact, as if in ignorance or repudiation of preced-
ing scenes of cultural interface.
 This double move—the “making new” of ethnographic contact by a disavowal that 
cites the previous contact being disavowed—discloses the temporal complexity of eth-
nographic contact in the early twentieth century. This complexity does not, I wish to 
emphasize, disqualify or debunk contact as an epistemic virtue; on the contrary, it shows 
that contact is disciplinary and disciplining. In seeing for oneself, one also brackets that 
which one has not seen. Moreover, contact’s doubleness as always both original and rep-
etition helps us to see why classical ethnography comports so well with what Rosalind 
Krauss has called the “modernist myth” of originality.79
>> Barbarism and Primitivism 
That a “contact” with epistemological and aesthetic stakes is a feature of Williams’s poet-
ics is hardly disputable; after all, Williams not only claimed it repeatedly but also named 
a journal Contact—twice.80 Nor is it very controversial to suggest that anthropology, in 
its classical moment of professionalization, adopted contact (via fieldwork) as its pri-
mary epistemological guarantee. In order to draw out the explanatory power of contact 
as an epistemic virtue, I wish to show how it operates as part of one of Williams’s most 
troubling features, his frequent embrace of a violent primitivism. In doing so, I wish to 
put some pressure on the epistemic virtue in the sense that Daston and Galison propose, 
i.e., that it carries an ethical charge, as in Hejinian’s recuperation of “barbarism” as an 
epistemological and political commitment.81 But as Williams’s uses of contact reveal, the 
epistemic virtue makes its mode of commitment to knowledge into a virtue rather than 
regulating knowledge according to any outside ethical norm.
 “[O] meager times, so fat in everything imaginable! imagine the New World that rises 
to our windows,” Williams writes in his 1923 prose-verse hybrid Spring and All: 
Tomorrow we the people of the United States are going to Europe armed to kill every man, 
woman and child in the area west of the Carpathian Mountains (also east) sparing none. 
Imagine the sensation it will cause. First we shall kill them and then they, us. But we are 
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careful to spare the Spanish bulls, the birds, rabbits, small deer and of course—the Russians. 
For the Russians we shall build a bridge from edge to edge of the Atlantic—having first been 
at pains to slaughter all Canadians and Mexicans on this side. Then, oh then, the great fea-
ture will take place. 
Never mind; the great event may not exist, so there is no need to speak further of it. Kill! kill! 
the English, the Irish, the French, the Germans, the Italians and the rest: friends or enemies, it 
makes no difference, kill them all. The bridge is to be blown up when all Russia is upon it. . . .
This is something never before attempted. None to remain; nothing but the lower verte-
brates, the mollusks, insects, and plants. Then at last will the world be made anew.82
From “New World” to “world . . . made anew,” the ironized fantasy of total destruction 
that Williams sets up early in Spring and All is framed in explicitly national terms, reca-
pitulating the horrors of the Great War in euphoric language that cheerfully acknowl-
edges the fantasized new world as “a perfect plagiarism,” as well as somehow genuinely 
new. “In fact now,” he writes ironically, “for the first time, everything IS new. Now at last 
the perfect effect is being witlessly discovered. The terms ‘veracity’ ‘actuality’ ‘real’ ‘nat-
ural’ ‘sincere’ are being discussed at length, every word in the discussion being evolved 
from an identical discussion which took place the day before yesterday.”83 This “new 
world” is also a “New World,” a palimpsestic site of contact remade as first contact.
 Williams’s version of the “new,” rooted in “‘veracity’ ‘actuality’ ‘real,’ ” likewise stakes 
an epistemological claim in its performance of contact, and in doing so enacts not only an 
experimental epistemic virtue but also a familiar trope of modernism.84 Yet the violence 
on which it is predicated suggests something closer to a colloquial, and deeply colonial, 
sense of barbarism than to the literalized and recuperated version that Hejinian will 
later propose. As Michael Taussig puts it, the “convenient term of reference, ‘barbarism,’ 
does double service, registering horror and disgust at this application of power, while at 
the same time ratifying one of that power’s most essential images, that of the barbaric—
the savage, the brute, and so forth. In condemning violence as savage, I endorse the very 
notion of the savage.”85 For Taussig, it is this “very notion of the savage” that creates the 
conditions for colonial violence, insofar as it is a condition that is first projected, then 
mimicked in the form of genocide. Here, Williams fantasizes a universal violence among 
“civilized” (or “modern”) nations (the conditions of the Great War), but that very vio-
lence, locating its point of origin in a “New World,” mimics an imagined “savagery,” in 
what Taussig calls the “colonial mirror of production”: “the mimicry by the colonizer of 
the savagery imputed to the savage.”86
 Modern warfare thus enacts the same primitivist temporality—what Johannes Fabian 
identified (in anthropology) as a “denial of coevalness,” or what Dipesh Chakrabarty 
has named “historicism”—that stages the repeated effacement and reinstatement of 
first contact.87 It is in obedience to the same logic that Williams’s imagined destruc-
tion results in the recapitulation of a developmental sequence: “Through the orderly 
sequences of unmentionable time EVOLUTION HAS REPEATED ITSELF FROM THE 
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BEGINNING.”88 The enabling violence of Spring and All provides the fresh canvas for art 
by making a “new world” of an already peopled one. 
 Unlike Language’s avowed “barbarism,” then, Williams’s enactment of contact is 
explicitly primitivist. For instance, when Williams re-launched Contact in 1932 (the new 
volume 1 thus restaging Contact as, so to speak, first Contact), he declared on the cover 
that “Contact will attempt to cut a trail through the American jungle without the use of 
a European compass.” This announced a program of discovery that peculiarly places the 
poet in the position of both discoverer and discovered, both native (“without the use of a 
European compass”) and colonizer (“to cut a trail through the American jungle”). There 
is no extricating contact from primitivism, and that primitivism is both aesthetic and 
epistemological. To effect contact with “the good Jersey dirt” and to speak “plain Ameri-
can” (“without the use of a European compass”) is to embrace a simplicity enabled only 
by a primitivism’s deep temporal complexity. Thus in the famous lines from the first poem 
in Spring and All, from which Paul Mariani quotes the title of his Williams biography, the 
fantasy of indigeneity again rests on a more complex citation of an effaced first contact: 
They enter the new world naked, 
cold, uncertain of all 
save that they enter. All about them 
the cold, familiar wind—
Now the grass, tomorrow 
the stiff curl of wildcarrot leaf
One by one objects are defined— 
It quickens: clarity, outline of leaf
But now the stark dignity of 
entrance—Still, the profound change 
has come upon them: rooted they 
grip down and begin to awaken89
The plants that grow “by the road to the contagious hospital” “enter the new world,” a 
citation of the American New World of only a few pages before, as if colonizing. Yet they 
also enter familially, where the wind is “familiar,” by being born into it, “naked.” The 
stepwise emergence of forms in the poem marks out a linear temporality that echoes the 
line of the road: “now,” “tomorrow,” “one by one.” This seriality of emergence shows the 
logic of contact at work, as one item follows as if organically from the next. Moreover, 
this orderly sequence suggests the possibility of pure elementary forms, observable as 
they emerge. Despite the book’s repeated announcements that “THE WORLD IS NEW,” 
this poem also declares its own disavowed precedents, not only Eliot’s “roots that clutch” 
but also the day-by-day emergence of forms in the book of Genesis. Both “rooted” and 
“grip[ping] down,” the plants are neither quite native nor invasive, but somehow both, 
offered in a “plain American” that is at the same time a linguistic discovery.90 In this, 
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contact is the interface of what Anne Cheng has identified as modernism/primitivism’s 
“second skin”: “primitive” nudity, insofar as it is worn as modernist plain style, also serves 
as a form of “civilized” clothedness or (by the same stroke) “primitive” adornment.91
 Despite key differences, then, the “barbarism” of Spring and All is also akin to the 
barbarism that Hejinian espouses in her essay, insofar as it relies on an epistemic vir-
tue—contact—that aims to produce what Hejinian calls an “aesthetic discovery [that] 
is congruent with social discovery,” not hermetically formal but in contact with a cul-
ture.92 Both experimentalisms see linguistic alienness (in English!) as a site of “discov-
ery,” even if they operate on different terms, in different historical circumstances, and to 
different ends. This kinship thus also reveals how Language writing’s tendency toward a 
temporality of simultaneity is a natural counterpart to contact’s temporality of primitiv-
ism: whereas what is supposedly primitive is cast into pastness (as in Fabian’s “denial of 
coevalness”), contemporaneity—as Williams’s imagined killing spree suggests—is con-
ferred by a relation of war. Importantly, the state-funded, early Cold War “culture at 
a distance” anthropology project headed by Margaret Mead, whose primary method-
ological challenge was the impossibility of the kind of contact called for in ethnographic 
fieldwork, was called the “Columbia University Research in Contemporary Cultures” 
group—contemporary, as opposed to primitive. The warrant for studying such cultures, 
as well as the necessity of studying them “at a distance,” was war.93
 Contact’s palimpsests would thus take on new forms after 1945. As Mimi Thi Nguyen, 
writing of the aftermath of the Vietnam War, has pointed out, primitivist address was 
reconfigured as what she calls “the gift of freedom,” something that is liberal empire’s 
to bestow and which, following Jacques Derrida’s theorization of the gift, always incurs 
an extended and unpayable debt. Importantly, the gift of freedom is typically bestowed 
through war, avowed or otherwise. If succeeding iterations of empire produce the other 
as temporally past, then the gift of freedom marks liberal empire’s right “to set and speed 
up the timetable,” as Nguyen puts it. Thus, she argues, “the invitation to coevality also 
imposes violence . . . through the intervention (a war, or development) that rescues his-
tory for those peoples stalled or suspended in time.”94
 Given these transformations and continuities, there is some historical irony in the 
way that Language writing sought a usable past in an experimental literature whose 
epistemological strength could counter the language-games of state violence. In particu-
lar, in addition to critical work that theorized and canonized American experimentalism, 
Language writers in the 1980s made their own attempts at contact, though not ethno-
graphic, with one of the very cultures taken up by Mead’s group at Columbia, that of Rus-
sia. These manifested in serious efforts of translation, collaboration with Soviet poets, 
and the visits to the Soviet Union that I mentioned at the beginning of this essay. 
 Like their anthropologist contemporaries whose “literary turn” led to the intensive 
self-scrutiny of Writing Culture and related work, Language writers sought to construe 
their own encounters with the Cold War “other” reflexively.95 Leningrad is framed as a 
provisional, reflexive mini-ethnography; as Hejinian introduces the volume: “This col-
laboration is about that week, about juxtaposition, happenstance, double vision, vistas, 
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and a flow of observations and expectations kept in suspense.”96 Hejinian opens the vol-
ume by presenting the encounter as one with knowledge at stake, writing, “I’ve been 
back since, but I don’t know any more.” Or, as Watten names the epistemological hope 
invested in contact: “there is a history of cultural figures that have developed from the 
Cold War for the dilemma of Us/Them, and these figures have left residual traces that 
must be renegotiated when faced with the real Soviet Union. To do so is to confront the 
fantasy and dread occasioned by such denial with real knowledge.”97 Seeing for oneself—
contact—is an epistemic virtue that dispels fantasy and state propaganda. Yet this is also 
an encounter in which knowledge is gathered by “juxtaposition, happenstance, double 
vision,” and, in “this collaboration,” through writing itself. Thus, in the book’s introduc-
tory section, all of the authors reflect on what the Russian avant-garde has meant to their 
poetics—famously, a great deal—and all of them introduce this engagement by histori-
cally situating it against Vietnam, the Cold War, or both.98 
 These gestures both self-historicize and, at the same time, repeatedly stage the 
authors’ awareness of at least some of the limitations entailed by their visit to the Soviet 
Union, deliberately effacing their authority in the process. Watten, for one, reflects on 
Leningrad as “a first moment in this as-yet-undetermined genre” of “accounts of the 
‘opening’ of the Soviet Union,” a genre that he places in parallel with the “substantial lit-
erature—often written along romantic, nineteenth-century travel narrative lines—of the 
reencounter of China by the west in the 1970s.” Aiming to deflect any hint of a conquer-
ing Robinson Crusoe-like subject in this qualified first contact, Watten argues that the 
Soviet case “will necessitate other and more difficult figures for interpretation than those 
of a Third World-oriented neocolonialist fantasy.” Hejinian, likewise, qualifies her own 
relation to Russian literature and avows her own situatedness in an American literature 
“contextualized by the social and politi-
cal life of the time.” “I myself,” she writes, 
“had a fantastic rather than a comprehen-
sive relationship with the works of some-
one like Velimir Khlebnikov . . . because I 
had no Russian context for understanding 
the scale and intentions (and hence the 
meaning) of his work.”99 
 Such gestures suggest that Language’s 
investment in contact as an epistemic vir-
tue is a critical one that imagines writers 
“inside as well as outside the histories of 
contact on which they follow,” as Pratt 
puts it.100 The Cold War ethics of contact 
are already different from, even if also heir 
to, those of contact in the “classical” age of ethnography, the 1920s. Effacing authorial 
identity emerges here as a feature of the epistemic virtue of contact for the Language 
writers. Pratt describes how, in Nisa: The Life and Words of a !Kung Woman (1981), Mar-
The Cold War ethics of contact are 
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to, those of contact in the “classical” 
age of ethnography, the 1920s. Effacing 
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feature of the epistemic virtue of contact 
for the Language writers.
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jorie Shostak produces an arrival scene that almost brutally renounces the production 
of ethnographic contact as first contact, her informants gushing about the last ethnog-
raphers who came through and the gifts of “Western commodities” that the ethnogra-
phers gave them. “It is an awful scene, a real return of the repressed,” Pratt writes, and 
for the authors of Leningrad, something like this renunciation is important enough to be 
staged repeatedly, both in the introduction and across the text.101 As Davidson frames the 
doubleness of encounter, “the city is given to us as part of the collective unconscious of a 
generation growing up during the Cold War. By the time we step off the plane, we have, 
to some extent, already arrived.”102
 The necessity of reflexivity is evident, in Leningrad, in the ways that the poetic lan-
guage-game of experimentalism is severely tested by contact with Leningrad itself. Like 
Hejinian, Silliman writes of his fascination and identification with avant-gardist Russian 
poetry and scholarship, only to affirm the strain that the visit to Leningrad places on that 
identification. “When, in 1982, the first issue of Poetics Journal published Richard Shel-
don’s translation of Shklovsky’s ‘Plotless Literature,’ I read it . . . as though the text were 
speaking of my own poetry directly,” Silliman writes, situating his visit in a history that 
includes both attachment and a dependence on translation. “This, however,” he adds, 
“is not the Marxism of which Leningrad poets speak, nor with which Russians have 
had to contend for more than seventy years.”103 Many of the writers that the Language 
poets meet have distanced themselves from the Russian historical avant-garde, “largely 
because it is perceived by them, in the end, to have served the state,” as Watten puts it.104 
The Language poets’ Russian-derived aesthetic tools for resisting the totalizing logic of 
the Cold War have less utility in the actual Russia. This necessitates what Watten calls 
an “ethics of partial knowledge” made available, not quite by the Russian avant-garde, 
but by a contemporary rereading of it, “available if one cares to read it in that tradition of 
Russian literature inaugurated by Shklovsky.”105 Responding to political necessity means 
reinterpreting the historical avant-garde’s legacy—an act of “white recovery,” as I have 
suggested—in order to make its historically situated knowledge-production available to 
a new political situation. As Davidson puts it, “the [Russian] formalist generation’s aes-
thetic motivation becomes our generation’s critical goal.”106 In Leningrad, this tension 
between the Language writers’ faith in the political purchase of their experimental poet-
ics and their apprehension of their Soviet counterparts’ skepticism—both of which arise 
from a commitment to contact—is never resolved, only held in reflexive suspension.
 In Leningrad, systematic repudiations of authorial identity, both uttered and per-
formed, emerge as the mark of epistemic virtue in general and as a way of countering the 
state’s language game of agonistic alterity in particular. The book’s nonlinear coauthor-
ship, Watten argues, “reinforce[s] the dilemma of the subject” generated by Cold War 
rhetorics that made identification with the Soviet “enemy” appear as the only alternative 
to total assent to state knowledge, as well as “comment[ing] on other more . . . authorita-
tive ways of voicing the difference between our world and that of the Soviet Union.”107 
These literary strategies, what Davidson calls “art’s ability to intervene in, not simply 
on, the rhetoric of power,” are thus proposed as the simultaneously epistemological and 
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political means of experimentalism.108 Yet even if the methods are quite different, the 
experimentalism at work in this particular articulation of Language poetics also looks 
startlingly similar to some of the ideals of the defense strategists: an effort to eliminate 
subjective selfhood, even to counterintuitive ends, in order to arrive at a better account 
of reality. To be clear, I am not suggesting that Language poetry is just another version 
of Cold War defense strategy; they have very different ends. Rather, I wish to point out 
that both are engaged in the construction of subjectivity-effacing language-games aimed 
at the production of knowledge, and that they share key premises about what producing 
knowledge might entail. 
 Indeed, in their self-historicization, the Language writers concede this, pointing over 
and over to the structural inescapability of state rhetorics of global alterity. The “para-
noid” simultaneity of this historical consciousness is evident in the authors’ recurring 
identification with a “generation” (with Silliman identifying himself, “like Arkadii Drag-
omoshchenko,” as “a ‘victory baby’ of the Second World War”).109 In Leningrad, homoge-
neous, empty time becomes the commonality that structures experiences, and analyses, 
of alterity. One unintended but powerful consequence of the political purchase attrib-
uted to experimentalism is the already discussed tendency to treat the effacement of 
authorial subjectivity, understood as an epistemic virtue, as more fundamentally political 
than racially conscious work by writers of 
color.110 We can see how this logic operates 
at the level of language, especially when 
epistemic virtues are at stake, as well as—
in retrospect—that logic’s fragility, which 
it shared with the hermetic rationalities of 
state violence that were its cue and coun-
terpart. Experimental writing—includ-
ing its resistance to historicization—is a 
product of its (double) times, manifesting 
formally but signifying historically. Read-
ing experimentalism historically allows 
us to appreciate the powerful scope of its 
intellectual and political ambitions as well 
as to apprehend—now that “innovation” 
is unambiguously the byword of power—the ways in which its responsiveness to state 
violence was always in part a complicity.111 This is a complicity in which all professional 
scholarship continues to share, universally but not at all trivially, because epistemic vir-
tues have a history of being conflated with virtue in general. Indeed, I have not aimed 
in this essay to explain why experimental writing has not succeeded in thwarting state 
violence; this seems obvious at a time when state violence by way of police, permanent 
drone warfare, and the prison-industrial complex seem only to be on the rise. Rather, 
I’ve hoped to illuminate the context in which it seemed plausible that it might—a context 
that still has much to teach us about our changing hopes for literature. 
Reading experimentalism historically allows 
us to appreciate the powerful scope of its 
intellectual and political ambitions as well 
as to apprehend—now that “innovation” is 
unambiguously the byword of power—the 
ways in which its responsiveness to state 
violence was always in part a complicity.
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